# PEACE EDUCATION

A 20+10 ECTS Continuing Education Programme

*Four Courses and a Project Thesis (5+5+5+5+10)*

*Course Proposal*

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## Rationale

Three forces converge to make peace education urgent for Norwegian professionals working with youth. The first is a fragmented information environment in which AI-generated content and algorithmic curation polarize public debate. The second is a generation of young people growing up under climate anxiety, visible warfare, and identity-shaping mobilization. The third is a public sector that has lost confidence in the classical liberal-pluralist responses that served Norwegian institutions for the better part of two postwar generations. None of these forces is fully understood. None is going away. Each interacts with the others in ways that compound rather than offset their effects. Together they describe the conditions under which teachers, NGO programme staff, public servants, librarians, and youth workers are now expected to do their work — and the conditions under which they are increasingly telling colleagues and researchers that they no longer know how to proceed (Hess & McAvoy, 2015; Mounk, 2018; Krastev, 2017; Applebaum, 2020).

This programme is built on the conviction that the situation is serious but not hopeless. The conceptual resources for navigating it exist, distributed across peace research, communication studies, political science, education research, and the practitioner traditions of dialogue work and reconciliation practice. What is missing is a structured continuing-education pathway that brings these resources together for the people who actually face the situation in their daily work.

The four taught courses and the integrating thesis component proposed below are designed to fill that gap. The remainder of this rationale develops the three convergent forces in turn, drawing the analytical map that the programme then equips candidates to use.

### First Force: The Fragmented Information Environment

The information environment in which young Norwegians form political identities, encounter contested events, and develop civic dispositions has changed fundamentally in the past fifteen years, and changed again — more rapidly and more disorienting in its consequences — in the past three. The rational-critical public sphere that Habermas (1989) reconstructed from the eighteenth century European bourgeoisie was always more an idealization than an accurate description of historical fact, and recent scholarship has criticized its exclusions on multiple grounds (Fraser, 1990; Calhoun, 1992). But the model retained enough purchase on twentieth-century democratic life that its erosion is felt by those who came of age inside its institutions. Newspapers shrunk and consolidated; broadcast audiences fragmented; social media restructured the economics of attention and the architecture of public discourse; and most recently, generative AI has begun to rewrite the relationship between human authorship and public communication in ways that are not yet stable enough to assess (Couldry & Mejias, 2019; Crawford, 2021; Zuboff, 2019).

The structural diagnosis of this transformation has multiple competing versions. The *information disorder* framework developed by Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) — distinguishing misinformation (false content shared without intent to deceive), disinformation (false content shared with intent to deceive), and malinformation (true content shared with intent to harm) — has become the standard typology in European policy work and is useful precisely because it refuses the simpler *fake news* framing that conflated quite different problems. The structural-economic diagnosis offered by Zuboff (2019) under the heading of *surveillance capitalism* treats the platform business model itself, not its individual content failures, as the deeper problem. The political-economy critique of platform capitalism developed by

Couldry and Mejias (2019) extends this analysis with attention to *data colonialism* — the appropriation of human experience as raw material for proprietary processing. None of these analyses is fully satisfactory on its own, but together they describe a transformation that the educational, NGO, and public-sector institutions Norwegian professionals work in have not yet fully metabolized.

The Norwegian and Nordic context has its own specific shape within the broader European condition. The public-broadcasting tradition of NRK and SVT, the strong newspaper subscription culture, the relatively high media trust documented by the Reuters Institute (Newman et al., 2024), and the continuing role of the Christian-cultural and folk-high-school traditions in public discourse have buffered some of the worst pathologies seen in less institutionally grounded media systems. The Hallin and Mancini (2004) classification of Nordic countries within the Democratic Corporatist model captures something real about this resilience. But buffering is not immunity, and the Nordic media systems are now visibly under stress. Local newspapers have closed at significant rate over the past decade; trust has declined among younger cohorts at faster pace than among older ones (Newman et al., 2024); and the platform-mediated portion of news consumption has continued to grow, particularly among the under-thirty audience that occupies most of the educational and youth-oriented work this programme addresses (Medietilsynet, 2023).

Generative AI changes the analytical situation in ways that the disinformation-studies literature is still working to absorb. Synthetic media — deepfaked video and audio, AI-generated still images, increasingly convincing AI-generated text — is no longer a future risk but a present condition (Chesney & Citron, 2019). The 2023 Slovakian parliamentary election was disrupted by a synthetic audio recording released two days before voting; the war in Ukraine has produced a steady stream of synthetic content from multiple sides; the Gaza war has produced both deepfakes and the *liar's dividend* effect by which authentic documentation is dismissed as fake (Chesney & Citron, 2019). Detection technologies, watermarking schemes, and provenance frameworks are developing but are unlikely to keep pace with generation capabilities in any near-term horizon (Crawford, 2021). The European response — the AI Act, the Digital Services Act, the implementation work of national authorities including Medietilsynet and Datatilsynet — represents a serious attempt at structural governance, but its outcomes are not yet known and its enforcement capacities remain uncertain.

The deeper problem for peace education is not any single category of harmful content but the cumulative effect on civic epistemology — on how publics come to know what they know, on the conditions under which warranted disagreement is possible, and on the resources available for the kind of grounded conversation that democratic life requires (Pickard, 2020; Benkler et al., 2018). Bruns (2019) has cautioned against oversimplified filter-bubble narratives, and his caution is well-taken; the empirical record on filter-bubble effects is more mixed than popular accounts suggest. But the broader concern about the conditions of public discourse cannot be dismissed by pointing out that one specific causal mechanism is less robust than first claimed. What young Norwegians experience as their information environment includes algorithmic recommendation systems they do not control, platform interfaces designed for engagement rather than understanding, content from sources whose institutional grounding is opaque, AI-generated material whose provenance is increasingly difficult to verify, and a residual but declining stream of professionally edited journalism whose economic basis continues to weaken (Pickard, 2020; Suzor, 2019).

The MacBride Report (1980) — the UNESCO-commissioned analysis of global communication inequality, marginalized through US and UK pressure in the 1980s but never refuted — anticipated a great deal of

what Norwegian professionals are now encountering. Its diagnosis of structural imbalance in global news flow, its proposal for a New World Information and Communication Order, and its insistence that communication be treated as a structural rather than purely individual matter remain illuminating four decades on (Mansell, 2012; Nordenstreng, 2010). The contemporary expression of this older tradition is the concept of *communicative sovereignty* — the capacity of communities to shape their own symbolic environments — which has begun to circulate in European policy debate alongside the related but distinct concept of digital sovereignty (Couldry & Mejias, 2019). The proposal for a Sustainable Development Goal on Sustainable Culture (SDG 18) is one current expression of the same underlying concern.

For peace education, the practical implication is twofold. First, the field cannot continue to operate as if the information environment were a neutral background condition. The structural transformation of public communication is itself a peace-education problem because it is the medium through which young people encounter conflict, develop their dispositions toward it, and form the cognitive habits that will shape their adult civic life. Second, the field cannot adopt an uncritical media-literacy posture that treats the problem as one of individual user skill. Individual literacy matters and is taken seriously across Courses 1 through 4 below. But the structural conditions are not changeable through individual literacy alone, and treating them as if they were is a category error that has limited the effectiveness of media-literacy work for two decades (boyd, 2017; Wineburg & McGrew, 2019).

### Second Force: A Generation under Compound Pressure

The young people Norwegian professionals work with are not a generation in some loose sense; they are a cohort with documented characteristics that distinguish them from their predecessors in measurable ways. They have grown up entirely inside the smartphone era. They have lived their adolescence under the sustained pressure of climate communication. They have witnessed multiple wars in real time through social media platforms whose architecture amplifies the most affecting imagery. They have come of age during a global pandemic that disrupted their schooling and social development in ways whose long-term consequences are still being charted (Twenge, 2023; Haidt, 2024). And they are entering political life under conditions in which the institutions that shaped the political socialization of previous generations — local newspapers, broadcast television, mass-membership political parties, civic associations — are visibly weaker than they were thirty years ago (Putnam, 2000; Skocpol, 2003).

The empirical record on this generation is fuller than is sometimes appreciated. The Norwegian Ungdata surveys document trends across school satisfaction, mental health, substance use, and civic engagement that paint a complex picture, with some indicators improving and others — particularly among adolescent girls — markedly worsening across the past decade (Bakken, 2023). The Reuters Institute work on news consumption documents systematically lower engagement with news among under-thirty cohorts and a corresponding shift toward platform-mediated information environments (Newman et al., 2024). The C-REX research at the University of Oslo on right-wing extremism and political polarization provides Norwegian-specific data on the radicalization vulnerabilities of contemporary youth (Jupskås & Segers, 2020; Bjørgo, 2016). The international developmental-psychology literature on adolescence in the digital era, while contested in its causal claims, provides a baseline for understanding the conditions under which civic identity is now formed (Steinberg, 2014; Twenge, 2023).

Climate anxiety is among the most well-documented features of this cohort's psychological landscape. The global survey by Hickman and colleagues (2021), covering ten thousand young people across ten countries including high-income European democracies, found that more than half of respondents reported feeling sad, anxious, angry, powerless, helpless, and guilty about climate change, and substantial majorities reported that government responses were inadequate. The Norwegian data are broadly consistent with this international pattern. What is striking is not the existence of climate concern — that is hardly news — but the depth of its psychological and political consequences. Hickman and colleagues report that climate-related distress is associated with a sense of betrayal by adult institutions, including government. This is a peace-education concern, not just a climate-education concern, because the experience of betrayal by institutions is foundational to the political dispositions young people carry into adult life. A generation that learned in adolescence that institutions cannot be trusted to protect their futures will be a particular kind of political generation, with consequences for democratic stability that we are only beginning to understand (Krastev & Holmes, 2019; Mounk, 2018; Applebaum, 2020).

Visible warfare is the second pressure. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the first European war of the smartphone era; the Gaza war that began in October 2023 has been the most thoroughly documented in real time of any armed conflict in human history; the Sudanese civil war, less visible in Norwegian public discourse but the largest current humanitarian catastrophe, has nonetheless reached young people through social media in ways that previous African conflicts did not (UN OCHA, 2024). The exposure conditions are unprecedented. A fourteen-year-old in Kristiansand can encounter, in the course of an hour on TikTok, footage from active combat in Ukraine, an Israeli airstrike on Gaza, displaced families in Sudan, and a fact-check disputing whether one of the videos is authentic. The cognitive demand of integrating this material is significant; the developmental-psychological literature suggests that adolescents process this kind of imagery differently from adults, with greater emotional reactivity and less capacity for the kind of contextual buffering that experienced consumers of news develop over time (Steinberg, 2014; Pfefferbaum & North, 2020).

The result is not, in most cases, anything like trauma in the clinical sense. But it is something — and that something is showing up in Norwegian classrooms and youth programmes in patterns that experienced practitioners are reporting with increasing frequency. Students ask questions that their teachers do not feel competent to answer. Discussions about Israel and Palestine, about Ukraine and Russia, about climate policy, about migration, become charged in ways that exceed the discussion-leading capacities the teachers were trained for. Some teachers respond by avoiding the topics; others by allowing the discussions to drift; others by asserting an authority that they themselves do not feel they hold. None of these responses is adequate, and all are visible to students, who draw their own conclusions about what their institutions can and cannot do (Hess & McAvoy, 2015; Reardon, 1988; Bajaj & Hantzopoulos, 2016).

Identity-based mobilization is the third pressure on this generation. The political identities available to contemporary European youth are organized around clusters of meaning — gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, nationality, climate disposition — in ways that earlier generations would have found unfamiliar. This is not a complaint about identity politics; it is a description of the conditions under which civic life is now conducted. The relevant scholarly literature is large and contested. Mounk (2023) provides one influential synthesis with which serious peace-education work will need to engage critically. The radicalization literature documents specific vulnerability patterns including masculinity-based far-right mobilization, jihadist recruitment, and emerging patterns of left-coded mobilization that have not yet

received equivalent research attention (Bjørgo, 2016; Ranstorp, 2016; Kundnani, 2014). The *conflict entrepreneurs* — actors who profit from polarization through attention economies, political fundraising, or geopolitical influence operations — are a documented feature of the contemporary landscape (Ripley, 2021; Marwick & Lewis, 2017).

For Norwegian peace education, the practical question is how to work with young people whose political identities are forming under these conditions, in ways that take their concerns seriously without confirming their worst impulses. The classical liberal-pluralist response — emphasizing common ground, civic norms, and the procedures of democratic disagreement — is necessary but visibly insufficient. The young people in our classrooms and programmes are not unaware of the structural inequalities, the climate emergency, the histories of exclusion, the contemporary armed conflicts; they have been thinking about these matters since they were children. They will not be persuaded by a peace-education tradition that asks them to bracket their concerns in the name of civility. They will, on the other hand, often respond to a peace education that takes their concerns seriously, gives them better analytical tools to understand them, and works with them on the disciplines of dialogue, listening, and disagreement that adult civic life will require (Bryn, 2018; Lederach, 1997; Reardon, 1988; Bajaj & Hantzopoulos, 2016).

### Third Force: A Public Sector under Crisis of Confidence

The third convergent force is the one that is hardest to discuss without sounding alarmist, and the one that has the most direct bearing on the design of this continuing-education programme. The Norwegian public sector — the schools, the kommuner, the directorates, the publicly funded NGOs that carry much of the country's social work — is staffed by professionals who, by international comparison, are exceptionally well-trained, exceptionally well-resourced, and exceptionally well-protected by the institutional and legal frameworks of the Nordic welfare state. They are also, in increasing numbers, telling researchers and supervisors that they no longer know how to do their work in the conditions they face (Helsedirektoratet, 2023; Skolelederforbundet, 2024). This is not a complaint about workload, although workload is part of it. It is a deeper crisis of confidence in the inherited responses that served Norwegian institutions through the latter twentieth century.

The classical liberal-pluralist response to social conflict had a definite shape. It assumed a public sphere capable of reasoned deliberation. It assumed institutions whose authority was widely accepted. It assumed a population sharing baseline civic norms even where it disagreed about substantive questions. It assumed media systems whose primary function was the provision of accurate information about public affairs. It assumed that political identities were primarily organized around economic interest and policy preference, mediated by political parties whose function was to aggregate and translate these into governance. Each of these assumptions has come under serious pressure in the past two decades. None has collapsed entirely. All are visibly weaker than they were when the professionals now staffing Norwegian institutions were trained (Mounk, 2018; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Applebaum, 2020; Galston, 2018). The resulting condition is what Krastev and Holmes (2019) have termed *the light that failed* — not the death of liberal democracy but the apparent exhaustion of its capacity to inspire confidence even in the populations it has served best.

The Norwegian situation is, by international comparison, very good. Trust in institutions remains high relative to most European peers (Norsk Monitor, 2023). The political system has weathered the major

shocks of the past fifteen years — the 22 July 2011 attacks, the migration debates of 2015, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Gaza war and the recognition of Palestine — without major institutional breakdown. The Sannhets- og forsoningskommisjonen (2023) report on the historical injustices against Sámi, Kvener, and Forest Finn populations was received and is being processed through normal political channels. None of this should be taken for granted, and none of it justifies the kind of catastrophist analysis that has become common in some American and Central European discussions. But Norwegian exceptionalism is also less robust than it sometimes appears, and the convergence of forces described in this rationale does not stop at the Norwegian border. The professionals working in schools and youth programmes in Drammen and Stavanger and Kristiansand encounter the same generative AI, the same algorithmic platforms, the same climate-anxious teenagers, the same charged conversations about Israel and Palestine, that their counterparts in Berlin and Lyon and Manchester encounter.

Several specific patterns of crisis-of-confidence appear across the literatures and across the practitioner reports. Teachers report increasing reluctance to address controversial subjects, even subjects they are formally required to address, out of concern about parent complaints, social-media exposure, and uncertainty about how to manage charged classroom dynamics (Hess & McAvoy, 2015; Skolelederforbundet, 2024). NGO communications staff report increasing difficulty maintaining a credible institutional voice when their audiences fragment across platforms and when their organizations' positions on contested international questions are scrutinized in ways that weren't true a decade ago. Public-sector caseworkers in IMDi, Bufdir, and the kommunal services report that their established practice manuals do not address the situations they actually face — the second-generation teenager radicalizing online, the climate-anxious young person whose school refusal has political content, the family newly arrived from Sudan or Ukraine whose trauma exceeds the categories the manuals contemplate. The librarians who have become, increasingly, the front line of public-information services in many Norwegian kommuner are reporting similar pressures (Audunson et al., 2019).

The crisis of confidence is, importantly, not a crisis of values. The Norwegian professionals this programme addresses overwhelmingly retain commitment to the values of inclusion, dignity, equal worth, and democratic participation that have shaped Nordic public life. What they have lost confidence in is not their values but the practical responses they were trained in. They were trained, broadly, to manage social conflict through procedural civility, balanced presentation of perspectives, an emphasis on common ground, and a confidence that institutions would back them when difficulties arose. The conditions described under the first two forces above — the fragmented information environment, the compound pressures on the youth they work with — have made each of these inherited practical responses harder to sustain. The institutions, while still relatively strong, are themselves visibly under pressure and cannot be relied on to provide the unconditional backing they once did.

This is precisely the problem peace education in its mature theoretical formulation is designed to address. Reardon's (1988) *comprehensive peace education*, Galtung's (1990) tripartite analysis of violence, Lederach's (1997, 2003) conflict transformation framework, and the practitioner traditions developed at Nansen Fredssenter and similar institutions across Europe (Bryn, 2018; Bajaj & Hantzopoulos, 2016) provide conceptual and practical resources that exceed the inherited liberal-pluralist response in two important respects. They take structural conditions seriously rather than treating them as background. And they recognize that conflict transformation is a craft requiring sustained training, not a disposition that adequate professionals will develop spontaneously through experience. The Norwegian peace-research

tradition, anchored at PRIO and continued in the work of Norwegian peace-and-human-rights institutions, has developed precisely these resources over the past sixty years (Nordby, 2018; Tveiten, 2025).

What has been missing is a structured continuing-education pathway through which working professionals can acquire these resources without leaving their jobs. The university sector has offered relevant master's-level programmes for those who can take a year or two off, but the population this rationale describes is by definition the population that cannot. The conferences, seminars, and short courses offered by various peace institutions are valuable but typically too brief to support the kind of conceptual and practical reorientation the situation requires. The professional-development infrastructure of the school sector and of the major NGOs has not yet developed peace-education offerings that match the scale of the need. This programme — four 5 ECTS courses and a 10 ECTS thesis component, delivered in samlingsbasert hybrid format with three weekend gatherings per course, anchored at UiA and at the major Norwegian peace institutions — is designed to fill that gap.

### Synthesis: Why Now, Why This Programme

The three forces interact. The fragmented information environment shapes the conditions under which the youth generation forms its political identities, and is itself a primary vector through which climate anxiety, war exposure, and identity-based mobilization reach young people in their daily lives. The pressures on the youth generation increase the demands on the public-sector professionals who work with them, while the inherited practical responses of those professionals were designed for a different information environment and a differently formed cohort. The crisis of confidence in the public sector reduces its institutional capacity to develop and disseminate adequate new responses, deepening the exposure of front-line professionals to conditions they cannot manage with their existing training. None of this is a mystery; the pattern has been visible for some time and has been described in adjacent literatures including the educational-policy literature on teacher attrition (Skolelederforbundet, 2024), the radicalization-prevention literature on practitioner overload (Bjørgo, 2016; Gielen, 2019), and the journalism-studies literature on the loss of professional confidence in news work (Pickard, 2020). What has been less common is a synthesis that names the convergence directly and proposes a programme of action proportionate to the situation.

This programme is one such proposal. It is anchored in the Department of Global Development and Planning at the University of Agder because the institutional fit is good: the department's existing work in development studies, planning, and global affairs provides the disciplinary infrastructure on which the four taught courses can be built, and the Future Learning Lab and the REACT consortium provide the research backbone for the thesis component and for ongoing curriculum development. The partnerships with Nansen Fredssenter, Arkivet freds- og menneskerettighetssenter, the Nobel Peace Center, NUPI, Fritt Ord, and Faktisk.no anchor the programme in the Norwegian peace-and-public-discourse institutional landscape and ensure that its contents remain connected to the contemporary practice of peace and free-expression work in the country. The hybrid samlingsbasert format ensures that working professionals can complete the programme without leaving their jobs, and the modular 5+5+5+5+10 structure allows candidates to enter at any point and proceed at their own pace within a three-year window.

The remainder of this document specifies the four courses and the thesis component in detail. The courses are sequenced for maximum coherence when taken as a complete programme, but each is designed to

stand alone for candidates whose situations or interests are partial. Course 1 establishes the conceptual foundations of peace education and situates the field within Norwegian and international traditions. Course 2 develops the practitioner skills of dialogue, facilitation, trauma-informed work, and intervention design. Course 3 builds geopolitical literacy adequate to the contemporary world order. Course 4 addresses peace communication in the AI era, drawing on the MacBride tradition and on the contemporary research on platform power, synthetic media, and algorithmic polarization. The thesis component integrates the four courses into a substantial piece of independent work, in either a Project Track or a Research Track, demonstrating the candidate's capacity to bring the programme's resources to bear on a question of professional or scholarly significance. Together, the four courses and the thesis form a complete videreutdanning of 30 ECTS, suitable for documentation toward kompetanseheving in the school sector and for professional development in the NGO and public-sector contexts the rationale has described.

The four courses are designed to stand alone (5 ECTS each) or stack into a 20 ECTS taught pathway. Candidates who complete all four courses are eligible for the 10 ECTS project thesis component, taking the total to 30 ECTS — the threshold for a formal videreutdanning. The full programme can be completed in two academic years of part-time study plus a third semester for the thesis, anchored in the Department of Global Development and Planning at the University of Agder.

### Programme Structure at a Glance

**Course 1 — Peace Education: Concepts, Histories, and Contemporary Challenges** (5 ECTS, autumn). Foundational concepts, Norwegian peace traditions, contemporary challenges.

**Course 2 — Practicing Peace Education: Dialogue, Media Literacy, and Youth Engagement** (5 ECTS, spring). Facilitation, dialogue methodology, trauma-informed practice, intervention design.

**Course 3 — Reading the New Geopolitics: Making Sense of a Changing World Order** (5 ECTS, autumn). Order in transition, contemporary conflicts, climate and tech as geopolitics, Norway in the new world.

**Course 4 — Peace Communication in the AI Era** (5 ECTS, spring). MacBride tradition, communicative sovereignty, synthetic media, algorithmic polarization, European responses.

**Component 5 — Project Thesis: Independent Study under Supervision** (10 ECTS, third semester or later). Sustained independent work in either a Project Track or a Research Track.

### Practical Organization

Each 5 ECTS course is organized as three weekend gatherings (Friday afternoon through Saturday late afternoon, approximately fourteen contact hours per gathering, forty-two contact hours per course) bridged by structured asynchronous work in Canvas. The three gatherings function as three pedagogical segments. Courses 1 and 3 run in autumn; Courses 2 and 4 run in spring. The project thesis is taken in any subsequent semester, typically autumn of Year 3.

Locations are chosen to anchor the sequence in Norway's peace-institution, foreign-policy, and free-expression landscape, distribute travel burden across regions, and place candidates in physical proximity to the institutions whose work they study. Each course holds two gatherings on the UiA Kristiansand campus and one gathering at a partner institution: the Nobel Peace Center and Nansen Fredssenter for Course 1; Nansen Fredssenter for Course 2; the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) for Course 3; and Fritt Ord, in cooperation with Faktisk.no, for Course 4.

The asynchronous component runs at approximately forty pages of reading per week across the semester, calibrated to part-time professional learners holding full-time work. Canvas hosts curated reading sets, short video lectures, structured discussion forums, and pre-gathering preparation tasks.

## Course 1 — Peace Education: Concepts, Histories, and Contemporary Challenges (5 ECTS)

### Target Audience

Working professionals — teachers in ungdomsskole and videregående, NGO programme staff, public servants, librarians, youth workers — who encounter young people asking hard questions about conflict, polarization, and global crisis, and who want a grounded conceptual vocabulary for responding.

### Learning Outcomes

***Knowledge.*** The candidate can account for foundational concepts in peace and conflict studies (negative and positive peace, direct/structural/cultural violence, conflict transformation); situate Norwegian and Nordic peace traditions historically, from Nansen humanitarianism through Galtung to contemporary institutions; and identify contemporary drivers of polarization in the digital public sphere.

***Skills.*** The candidate can read peace research literature critically, apply analytical frameworks to current conflicts and tensions, and articulate the relevance of peace education to their own professional context.

***General competence.*** The candidate can reflect critically on their own role as educator, mediator, or facilitator, and communicate peace concepts to non-specialist audiences without jargon.

### Segment A — Foundations

#### Weekend Gathering 1: UiA Kristiansand campus, with site visit to Arkivet freds- og menneskerettighetssenter (September)

##### *Module 1: What Is Peace Education?*

The segment opens by establishing peace education as a distinct field with its own genealogy. Reardon's (1988) formulation of *comprehensive peace education* — directed at the abolition of violence in all its forms and the cultivation of capacities for non-violent transformation — remains the field's organizing horizon. Bajaj and Hantzopoulos (2016) extend this tradition into a contemporary, globally distributed pedagogical project that integrates human rights, environmental sustainability, and intercultural understanding. The module distinguishes peace education from adjacent fields: from civic education (which assumes a stable polity), from global citizenship education (which often understates power and conflict), and from human rights education (which is rule-oriented rather than transformation-oriented). Contemporary relevance is grounded in UNESCO's recent reframing of peace education within the Education 2030 agenda (UNESCO, 2023) and in growing European concern about democratic backsliding (Mounk, 2018).

##### *Module 2: The Forms of Violence*

The conceptual core of the field rests on Galtung's (1969, 1990) tripartite distinction between *direct violence* (physical and psychological harm), *structural violence* (harm built into social arrangements), and *cultural violence* (the symbolic legitimation of the other two). The accompanying distinction between *negative peace* (absence of direct violence) and *positive peace* (presence of justice and non-exploitation) gives candidates a vocabulary for diagnosing peace problems beyond the absence of war. Lederach (2003) extends Galtung with a *conflict transformation* paradigm that treats conflict as inherent to social change and asks how relationships and structures can be transformed rather than merely managed. The contemporary relevance is unmistakable: structural violence frames much of what young people are

reading about climate, migration, and inequality, and cultural violence frames the symbolic environment of social media.

#### *Module 3: Norwegian and Nordic Peace Traditions*

The Nordic peace tradition is older and stranger than its current institutional expression suggests. The module traces a line from Fridtjof Nansen's interwar humanitarian work (Reynolds, 2008) through the postwar institutionalization of peace research at PRIO and the founding of Nordic peace studies as an academic discipline (Lawler, 2013). It introduces Arkivet freds- og menneskerettighetssenter in Kristiansand — a Gestapo headquarters turned peace-and-human-rights centre — and Nansen Fredssenter in Lillehammer, heir to the Nansen dialogue tradition through the Balkans work of Steinar Bryn (Bryn, 2018). The Saturday site visit at Arkivet allows candidates to read the relationship between physical place, historical memory, and contemporary peace pedagogy directly.

**Outcome of Weekend 1.** Candidates leave with a working vocabulary (peace, violence, conflict, transformation), a working genealogy (from Reardon and Galtung to contemporary practice), and a working sense of the Norwegian institutional landscape they are entering or already inhabit.

**Output of Weekend 1.** A 600-word concept map submitted in Canvas, in which each candidate situates one issue from their own professional context within the Galtung tripartite framework.

### Segment B — Contemporary Challenges

### Weekend Gathering 2: Oslo, in cooperation with the Nobel Peace Center (October)

#### *Module 4: The Polarized Public Sphere*

The information environment in which young people form political identities is no longer the public sphere theorized by Habermas (1989). Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) propose the now-standard typology of *information disorder* — misinformation, disinformation, malinformation — that gives candidates language for what they encounter in classrooms and youth programmes. Couldry and Mejias (2019) describe the structural pressures of platform capitalism on civic discourse, and Crawford (2021) extends the analysis to the political economy of artificial intelligence. The module treats *communicative sovereignty* as a peace concept: the capacity of communities to shape the symbolic environments in which their young people grow up. Contemporary relevance is acute given the documented role of social media in amplifying conflict around Gaza, Ukraine, and domestic Norwegian polarization. The communicative-sovereignty thread is developed at length in Course 4.

#### *Module 5: Youth in Crisis Times*

The module draws on the comparative literature on young people's political socialization in conditions of crisis (Hart & Henn, 2017) and on Norwegian survey research from Ungdata and C-REX at the University of Oslo (Jupskås & Segers, 2020). Climate anxiety is treated empirically (Hickman et al., 2021) rather than as a rhetorical figure. Exposure to wartime imagery through TikTok and Instagram is treated as a developmental and pedagogical fact, not a moral panic. The radicalization vulnerability literature (Bjørgo, 2016) is introduced descriptively, with the more practical engagement deferred to Course 2. The Oslo location supports Saturday workshop sessions with researchers from C-REX and practitioners from Redd Barna and IMDi, depending on availability.

**Outcome of Weekend 2.** Candidates leave able to read the contemporary information environment as a peace-education problem, and able to interpret youth distress without either pathologizing it or dismissing it.

**Output of Weekend 2.** A 1,000-word case analysis submitted in Canvas, in which each candidate describes a specific instance from their workplace — an incident, a conversation, a recurring tension — and analyzes it through the frameworks introduced in Modules 4 and 5.

### Segment C — Memory and Limits

#### Weekend Gathering 3: Lillehammer, hosted by Nansen Fredssenter (November)

##### *Module 6: Reconciliation and Historical Memory*

Reconciliation is treated through Lederach's (1997) framework of *truth, mercy, justice, and peace* as four faces of reconciliation in tension. The Norwegian case material includes the long aftermath of 22 July 2011 (Borchgrevink, 2013) and the work of the Norwegian Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the Sámi, Kven, and Forest Finn experience of fornorsking (Sannhets- og forsoningskommisjonen, 2023). The module introduces the contemporary debate about whether reconciliation discourses risk premature closure of unresolved injustice (Hirsch, 2012) and whether memory work can become its own form of cultural violence when imposed on those still experiencing harm. The Nansen Fredssenter setting allows direct engagement with practitioners of the Nansen dialogue tradition (Bryn, 2018).

##### *Module 7: What Peace Education Can and Cannot Do*

The course closes with sustained attention to its own limits. The module addresses the *false balance* problem (treating asymmetric conflicts as if they had two equivalent sides), the *facilitation versus indoctrination* boundary, and the question of whether educators in publicly funded institutions are obliged to neutrality, advocacy, or some third position (Hess & McAvoy, 2015). The literature on the unintended consequences of peace and prevention programming (Gielen, 2019) is taken seriously: well-meaning interventions can stigmatize, surveil, or radicalize. The module also addresses educator burnout and secondary trauma, threading forward into Course 2.

**Outcome of Weekend 3.** Candidates leave with a worked-through ethical position on their own role, a working knowledge of Norwegian reconciliation processes, and a critical disposition toward the field they are joining.

**Output of Weekend 3.** Final 3,000-word reflective essay (course assessment), submitted three weeks after the gathering, in which each candidate applies the conceptual apparatus of the course to a concrete situation in their own professional context and articulates an ethical position on their own role.

### Course 1 — Reading List

Bajaj, M., & Hantzopoulos, M. (Eds.). (2016). *Peace education: International perspectives*. Bloomsbury.

Borchgrevink, A. (2013). *A Norwegian tragedy: Anders Behring Breivik and the massacre on Utøya* (G. Puzey, Trans.). Polity.

Couldry, N., & Mejias, U. A. (2019). *The costs of connection: How data is colonizing human life and appropriating it for capitalism*. Stanford University Press.

Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural violence. *Journal of Peace Research, 27*(3), 291–305. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343390027003005

Hess, D. E., & McAvoy, P. (2015). *The political classroom: Evidence and ethics in democratic education*. Routledge.

Hickman, C., Marks, E., Pihkala, P., Clayton, S., Lewandowski, R. E., Mayall, E. E., Wray, B., Mellor, C., & van Susteren, L. (2021). Climate anxiety in children and young people and their beliefs about government responses to climate change: A global survey. *The Lancet Planetary Health, 5*(12), e863–e873. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(21)00278-3

Lederach, J. P. (1997). *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. United States Institute of Peace Press.

Reardon, B. A. (1988). *Comprehensive peace education: Educating for global responsibility*. Teachers College Press.

Sannhets- og forsoningskommisjonen. (2023). *Sannhet og forsoning — grunnlag for et oppgjør med fornorskingspolitikk og urett mot samer, kvener/norskfinner og skogfinner* [Report to the Storting]. Stortinget.

Wardle, C., & Derakhshan, H. (2017). *Information disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policymaking*. Council of Europe.

## Course 2 — Practicing Peace Education: Dialogue, Media Literacy, and Youth Engagement (5 ECTS)

### Prerequisites

Course 1 or equivalent professional background in peace, conflict, or education studies.

### Target Audience

The same constituency as Course 1, now ready to move from analytical literacy to facilitation practice. Particularly suited to candidates who will design or deliver interventions in classrooms, youth programmes, or municipal services.

### Learning Outcomes

***Knowledge.*** The candidate understands dialogue methodologies (Nansen dialogue, restorative practice, deliberative formats); can describe media and AI literacy as peace practice; knows the basics of trauma-informed work; and can describe research-based responses to radicalization.

***Skills.*** The candidate can facilitate a structured dialogue session with diverse participants, design a peace education intervention appropriate to their own context, use media analysis tools with young people, and recognize signs of distress or escalation in real time.

***General competence.*** The candidate maintains an ethical, non-instrumental stance toward participants; collaborates across school, NGO, and municipal sectors; and reflects critically on power, positionality, and impact.

### Segment A — Dialogue and Literacy

#### Weekend Gathering 1: UiA Kristiansand campus (February)

##### *Module 1: Dialogue Methodology*

The segment opens with the philosophical foundations of dialogue as a practice — Buber's (1970) *I–Thou* relation and Bohm's (1996) account of dialogue as suspended assumption — and then introduces three operational traditions. The Nansen dialogue method, developed in the Western Balkans through extended work with parties to the Yugoslav conflicts (Bryn, 2018), forms the Norwegian core. Restorative practice, drawn from the restorative justice tradition (Zehr, 2015), provides classroom-applicable techniques. Deep canvassing, drawn from US political organizing (Kalla & Broockman, 2020), offers an evidence-tested approach to changing attitudes through structured listening rather than persuasion. The candidates are introduced to the facilitator role as fundamentally non-instrumental: the facilitator does not own the outcome.

##### *Module 2: Media and AI Literacy as Peace Work*

The module operationalizes the analytical literacy from Course 1 into classroom and workshop practice. It introduces the SIFT method for source verification (Caulfield, 2019), the lateral reading research of the Stanford History Education Group (Wineburg & McGrew, 2019), and emerging frameworks for AI literacy adapted to Nordic school contexts (Long & Magerko, 2020). Generative AI is treated both as a literacy challenge and as a peace-relevant phenomenon: deepfakes have already shaped conflict narratives in Ukraine and Gaza, and synthetic media will increasingly shape Norwegian local political environments. The

Saturday session is hands-on: candidates work with real examples and design short literacy exercises for their own contexts. The structural and theoretical analysis of AI-mediated communication is taken up at depth in Course 4.

**Outcome of Weekend 1.** Candidates leave with a practical facilitation vocabulary, with hands-on exposure to a structured dialogue exercise, and with two or three media-literacy techniques they can use immediately.

**Output of Weekend 1.** A short facilitation plan (one page) for a forty-five-minute dialogue exercise to be delivered in Weekend 2, plus a media-literacy mini-lesson designed for a specific group in the candidate's professional setting.

### Segment B — Youth and Trauma

### Weekend Gathering 2: Lillehammer, hosted by Nansen Fredssenter, with facilitation lab (March)

#### *Module 3: Working with Youth*

The module draws on developmental research (Steinberg, 2014) and on the youth participation literature, particularly Hart's (1992) ladder of participation in its updated forms. It treats young people as agents rather than recipients, while taking seriously the developmental asymmetries in adolescent risk processing. The Norwegian context is anchored in the Barnekonvensjonen, the Opplæringsloven, and the practice traditions of Ungdom og Fritid and Barneombudet. The distinction between genuine participation and tokenism is given sustained attention.

#### *Module 4: Trauma-Informed Practice*

The module introduces the foundational principles of trauma-informed work (SAMHSA, 2014) — safety, trustworthiness, peer support, collaboration, empowerment, and cultural responsiveness — and the basic neurobiological framing offered by van der Kolk (2014), without pretending to make educators into therapists. Particular attention is given to working with young people who have experienced war, displacement, or family violence, drawing on Norwegian practice traditions developed at NKVTS (Nasjonalt kunnskapssenter om vold og traumatisk stress). The hard skill is recognizing when to refer and how, and the harder skill is doing one's own work without taking on what is not one's to take on.

#### *Module 5: Radicalization and Counter-Narratives*

The module engages the radicalization research of Bjørgo (2016) and the European literature on prevention (Ranstorp, 2016). It treats counter-narrative interventions empirically: what evaluation evidence suggests works, what backfires (and the *backfire* literature is substantial), and the specific Norwegian context of municipal SLT coordination and the post-22-July prevention infrastructure. The module is unromantic about quick fixes.

The Saturday afternoon at Nansen Fredssenter is a facilitation lab: candidates lead, in pairs, the forty-five-minute dialogue exercises they designed in Weekend 1. Structured peer feedback follows each exercise, with Nansen facilitators contributing where appropriate.

**Outcome of Weekend 2.** Candidates leave having facilitated and received feedback on a dialogue exercise; with a working sense of trauma-informed limits; and with a non-magical-thinking grasp of radicalization prevention.

**Output of Weekend 2.** A facilitation log (two pages) documenting the exercise led, peer feedback received, and the candidate's own reflection on what they would do differently.

### Segment C — Design and Ethics

#### Weekend Gathering 3: UiA Kristiansand campus (April)

##### *Module 6: Designing Interventions*

The module introduces a practical design cycle: needs assessment, theory of change, intervention design, proportionate evaluation. The theory-of-change literature (Vogel, 2012) is presented as a practical tool rather than a bureaucratic ritual. Evaluation is pitched at the scale of the work most candidates will actually do — a workshop series, a classroom unit, a youth-club programme — and draws on the developmental evaluation tradition (Patton, 2011). The module treats partnership across school, NGO, and municipal sectors as a design problem, not an afterthought.

##### *Module 7: Ethics and Limits*

The course closes with a sustained engagement with the ethical core of peace education practice. The neutrality-versus-advocacy question (Hess & McAvoy, 2015) is revisited from Course 1 with practical stakes. The module addresses positionality (one's own location matters), the asymmetry problem (some conflicts are not symmetric), the surveillance temptation (prevention work can drift into intelligence gathering), and the credibility problem (one's standing in the local community is itself an ethical condition of the work). It closes with attention to sustainability — of the practitioner, of the programme, and of the relationships the work depends on.

The Saturday afternoon is given to portfolio defenses: candidates present their designed interventions to a small panel of peers and faculty and respond to questions.

**Outcome of Weekend 3.** Candidates leave with a designed intervention ready to deliver; with a defended ethical position on their own role; and with a working network of peers across the cohort.

**Output of Weekend 3.** Final portfolio assessment, comprising (a) a designed intervention with theory of change and evaluation plan, (b) the facilitation log from Weekend 2, and (c) a 2,000-word reflective commentary connecting the design and the practice to the conceptual apparatus of both courses. Defended in the Saturday session.

### Course 2 — Reading List

Bjørgo, T. (2016). *Preventing crime: A holistic approach*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Bohm, D. (1996). *On dialogue* (L. Nichol, Ed.). Routledge.

Bryn, S. (2018). The Nansen dialogue network: A Norwegian contribution to long-term reconciliation work in the Western Balkans. *Forum for Development Studies, 45*(2), 355–375.

Caulfield, M. (2019). *SIFT (the four moves)*. Hapgood. https://hapgood.us/2019/06/19/sift-the-four-moves/

Hart, R. A. (1992). *Children's participation: From tokenism to citizenship* (Innocenti Essays No. 4). UNICEF International Child Development Centre.

Kalla, J. L., & Broockman, D. E. (2020). Reducing exclusionary attitudes through interpersonal conversation: Evidence from three field experiments. *American Political Science Review, 114*(2), 410–425. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000923

Patton, M. Q. (2011). *Developmental evaluation: Applying complexity concepts to enhance innovation and use*. Guilford Press.

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. (2014). *SAMHSA's concept of trauma and guidance for a trauma-informed approach* (HHS Publication No. SMA 14-4884). U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

van der Kolk, B. A. (2014). *The body keeps the score: Brain, mind, and body in the healing of trauma*. Viking.

Zehr, H. (2015). *The little book of restorative justice* (Rev. and updated ed.). Good Books.

### Course 3 — Reading the New Geopolitics: Making Sense of a Changing World Order (5 ECTS)

#### Prerequisites

None required. Course 1 is recommended but not mandatory. The course is designed to stand alone or to contribute to the 20 ECTS taught pathway.

#### Target Audience

Working professionals — teachers, NGO programme staff, public servants, librarians, youth workers, and journalists — who need analytical tools to make sense of the rapidly changing geopolitical order and to communicate it to students, audiences, colleagues, and the public. The course is designed for candidates already working with current affairs but feeling that whatever training they once had in international relations or area studies has been overtaken by events.

#### Learning Outcomes

***Knowledge.*** The candidate can describe the major shifts in the global geopolitical order since 2014; identify the principal contemporary conflicts and their structural drivers; situate Norwegian and Nordic positions within the new order; and account for the role of media, technology, and energy in shaping geopolitical change.

***Skills.*** The candidate can read news and policy documents about geopolitics critically across multiple sources and traditions; apply analytical frameworks to specific contemporary cases (Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, the Arctic, the energy transition); and explain shifts in the global order to non-specialist audiences without oversimplification.

***General competence.*** The candidate maintains a non-partisan analytical posture in contested terrain; recognizes and resists both Western-default and contrarian-as-default reading habits; and communicates complex geopolitical material in language appropriate to their professional context.

#### Segment A — The Order in Question

#### Weekend Gathering 1: UiA Kristiansand campus (September)

##### *Module 1: From Unipolarity to What?*

The opening module establishes the analytical question. The post-Cold-War unipolar moment, given fuller architectural form by Ikenberry (2020) and now subjected to his own sustained reassessment, has been challenged from multiple directions: the rise of China, the return of Russian revisionism, the assertiveness of regional powers (Brazil, India, Türkiye, the Gulf states), and the internal weakening of the United States as a coherent system anchor. Acharya's (2018) *multiplex world* formulation captures the current condition better than the simpler *multipolar* or *bipolar* framings: a world of overlapping, layered orders without a single hegemonic logic. Krastev (2017) gives the European reading of the same condition through the lens of post-1989 disillusion. The module considers what kind of order — if any — is replacing the post-1991 settlement, and what the practical stakes are for educators and practitioners working under conditions of orderly disorder.

##### *Module 2: The Wars on the Table*

The module addresses three contemporary conflicts that have transformed global politics since 2022. The Russian war on Ukraine is treated through multiple lenses: Snyder (2018) on Russian authoritarianism and historical memory, the European response, and the longer history of NATO expansion debates. The Gaza war (since October 2023) is treated as a compound case combining direct armed conflict, the proceedings at the International Court of Justice, the divisions inside Western political coalitions, and the Norwegian recognition of Palestine in May 2024. The Sudanese civil war (since April 2023) is given equal attention as the largest humanitarian crisis of the present moment, frequently absent from Norwegian public discourse. The module's aim is not to settle these debates but to give candidates frames for navigating them in their own professional contexts, where students, colleagues, and citizens are asking hard questions and deserve serious answers.

#### *Module 3: Norway in the New Geopolitics*

The module addresses Norway's position in the changing order. Topics include the Nordic accession to NATO (Finland 2023, Sweden 2024) and what it means for Norwegian security and identity; the Arctic as an emerging strategic theatre (Tamnes & Offerdal, 2014); Norwegian energy policy under conditions in which Norway became Europe's largest gas supplier after the Russian withdrawal; the ethical-investment debates around the Government Pension Fund Global; and the Storting's recognition of Palestine in 2024 as a marker of changing Norwegian international positioning. The module connects current debates to longer Norwegian foreign-policy traditions — humanitarian internationalism, Atlantic alignment, peace diplomacy — and asks how those traditions hold up under contemporary pressure.

**Outcome of Weekend 1.** Candidates leave with a working analytical map of the contemporary geopolitical order, three concrete contemporary cases worked through, and a grounded sense of Norway's position within the new constellation.

**Output of Weekend 1.** A 700-word geopolitical brief submitted in Canvas, in which each candidate analyzes one contemporary geopolitical event from the past three months using the frameworks introduced in the module.

### Segment B — The Drivers Beneath the Surface

### Weekend Gathering 2: Oslo, hosted by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) (October)

#### *Module 4: Climate, Energy, and the Geopolitics of Transition*

Energy and climate are increasingly inseparable from geopolitics. Bordoff and O'Sullivan (2022) argue that the energy transition is producing a new geopolitics, distinct from but in some ways more contested than the old oil order: dependent on critical-mineral supply chains (lithium, cobalt, rare earths) concentrated in a small number of producer and processor countries, vulnerable to disruption, and entangled with industrial-policy competition between the United States, China, and the European Union. The module examines the EU's response to Russian energy withdrawal, the US Inflation Reduction Act and its consequences for European industry, and the climate-displacement projections that will shape migration debates over the coming decades. The Norwegian paradox — oil exporter and climate-leader rhetoric — is treated directly, drawing on the public debate around oil-and-gas licensing and the pension fund's investments.

### *Module 5: Tech, AI, and Digital Sovereignty as Geopolitics*

The *technopolar moment* (Bremmer, 2021) names a condition in which the largest technology firms wield power approaching that of states. Miller's (2022) *Chip War* traces the semiconductor supply chain as a geopolitical infrastructure on which both economic and military futures depend. The structural critique of platform capitalism advanced by Couldry and Mejias (2019) — encountered in Course 1 — provides the bridge between digital order and democratic order. The module connects these analyses to the Norwegian and European debate about digital sovereignty, the EU AI Act and its implementation, the visible use of AI in warfare in Ukraine and Gaza, and the question of what communicative sovereignty means at a moment when foundation models are trained outside Europe and shape the symbolic environment of European publics. The communicative-sovereignty argument is developed at length in Course 4.

**Outcome of Weekend 2.** Candidates leave able to read climate and tech news as geopolitics, with a working sense of the structural drivers beneath the day-to-day headlines and the supply chains beneath the structural drivers.

**Output of Weekend 2.** A 1,000-word policy memo submitted in Canvas, in which each candidate analyzes either an energy/climate or a tech/AI development from a stated stakeholder perspective drawn from their own organization, sector, or constituency.

## Segment C — Practical Sense-Making

### Weekend Gathering 3: UiA Kristiansand campus (November)

### *Module 6: Reading Geopolitics through Media and Discourse*

The module returns to media as the primary mediator of geopolitical understanding. Hallin and Mancini's (2004) comparative media systems framework helps candidates read coverage from different national traditions as the product of different institutional arrangements rather than as neutral reporting. The MacBride tradition (MacBride, 1980) — the New World Information and Communication Order debates of the late 1970s — is recovered as a structural critique of global news flow that remains illuminating four decades on, particularly as the question of *communicative sovereignty* returns in new technological form. Decolonial readings of international affairs are introduced briefly. The module includes practical exercises in cross-source reading: comparing how a single contemporary event is covered across Norwegian, German, US, Indian, and Qatari outlets, and asking what each rendering takes for granted and what each leaves out.

### *Module 7: Responding in the Classroom, the NGO, the Office*

The course closes with sustained attention to the practical question that motivated it. How does a teacher answer a fourteen-year-old's question about Gaza without either evading or polemicizing? How does an NGO communications officer explain shifting donor landscapes to colleagues and partners? How does a public servant navigate consultations on policy whose geopolitical context has changed under their feet? The module draws on the controversial-issues literature already encountered in Course 1, develops practical frameworks for handling charged topics — including how to acknowledge the limits of one's own knowledge without losing authority, how to distinguish factual contestation from value contestation, and how to hold space for disagreement without false balance — and devotes Saturday afternoon to working through cases brought by participants from their own contexts.

**Outcome of Weekend 3.** Candidates leave with practical frameworks for handling charged geopolitical topics in their professional settings, tested against cases from their own work and from the cohort's collective experience.

**Output of Weekend 3.** Final 3,000-word reflective essay (course assessment), submitted three weeks after the gathering, in which each candidate analyzes a specific contemporary geopolitical question relevant to their professional context, articulates a defensible analytical position, and reflects on how they would communicate it to their primary audiences.

### Course 3 — Reading List

Acharya, A. (2018). *Constructing global order: Agency and change in world politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Bordoff, J., & O'Sullivan, M. L. (2022). Green upheaval: The new geopolitics of energy. *Foreign Affairs, 101*(1), 68–84.

Bremmer, I. (2021). The technopolar moment: How digital powers will reshape the global order. *Foreign Affairs, 100*(6), 112–128.

Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). *Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Ikenberry, G. J. (2020). *A world safe for democracy: Liberal internationalism and the crises of global order*. Yale University Press.

Krastev, I. (2017). *After Europe*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

MacBride, S. (1980). *Many voices, one world: Communication and society today and tomorrow*. UNESCO.

Miller, C. (2022). *Chip war: The fight for the world's most critical technology*. Scribner.

Snyder, T. (2018). *The road to unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America*. Tim Duggan Books.

Tamnes, R., & Offerdal, K. (Eds.). (2014). *Geopolitics and security in the Arctic: Regional dynamics in a global world*. Routledge.

## Course 4 — Peace Communication in the AI Era (5 ECTS)

### Prerequisites

None required. Course 1 or Course 3 is recommended. The course is designed to stand alone or to complete the 20 ECTS taught pathway.

### Target Audience

The same constituency as the preceding courses, with particular relevance for educators teaching media or social studies, NGO communications staff, journalists, public-sector communicators, librarians, and any practitioner whose work has been reshaped by generative AI and platform-mediated public discourse. The course is designed for candidates who recognize that something fundamental has shifted in how publics learn about the world, and who want analytical and practical equipment to work credibly in the new environment.

### Learning Outcomes

***Knowledge.*** The candidate can account for the peace-communication tradition (peace journalism, the MacBride tradition, communicative sovereignty); describe the principal ways in which generative AI is transforming public communication; and identify the European regulatory and institutional responses currently taking shape.

***Skills.*** The candidate can analyze AI-mediated content critically; recognize and reason about synthetic media; and design peace-oriented communication interventions appropriate to their own professional context.

***General competence.*** The candidate maintains an ethical, non-instrumental stance toward audiences; communicates honestly about the use of AI tools in their own work; and can hold a defensible professional position in contested AI-mediated terrain.

### Segment A — Foundations of Peace Communication

#### Weekend Gathering 1: UiA Kristiansand campus (February)

##### *Module 1: Peace Communication: A History and a Concept*

The module traces the development of peace communication as a distinct field, distinguishing it from but situating it alongside peace journalism (Galtung, 1998; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). The 1983 *Ferment in the Field* special issue of the *Journal of Communication* (Gerbner et al., 1983) marks a generational shift toward political-economy approaches in communication research, with implications that remain unresolved four decades later. The module establishes peace communication as concerned not only with how conflict is reported but with the structural conditions of public discourse — who speaks, who is heard, who controls the channels, and who pays for them. Norwegian traditions are introduced including the public-broadcasting tradition of NRK, the Christian-cultural tradition embodied by Kirkelig Kulturverksted, and the Nordic tradition of small independent press.

##### *Module 2: The MacBride Tradition and Communicative Sovereignty*

The MacBride Report (1980) — encountered briefly in Course 3 — is here the central historical text. Its diagnosis of structural inequality in global news flow, its proposal for a New World Information and Communication Order, and its subsequent marginalization in the 1980s through US and UK pressure on UNESCO are read as prologue to the present moment (Mansell, 2012; Pickard, 2020). The module develops *communicative sovereignty* as a peace concept: the capacity of communities to shape their own symbolic environments. The argument has practical stakes both for indigenous and minority communities — the Sámi case from Course 1 returns here — and for European publics in an era of foundation models trained largely outside Europe. The contemporary policy expression of this older tradition, including the proposal for a Sustainable Development Goal on Sustainable Culture (SDG 18), is introduced as a live debate.

#### *Module 3: The AI Turn in Public Communication*

The module establishes the basic conditions of AI-era public communication. Generative AI as a transformation of the symbolic environment is treated structurally (Crawford, 2021): not as a tool that has been added to an existing communication ecology but as a force that is reshaping that ecology from within. The module covers the synthetic-content explosion of 2022–2026, the capability progression of foundation models, the political economy of training data and compute, and the European position — neither US tech-libertarian nor Chinese state-controlled — that is being negotiated under acute time pressure. The module is honest about uncertainty: nobody fully knows how this will go, and serious practice involves working credibly under conditions of partial knowledge.

**Outcome of Weekend 1.** Candidates leave with a working concept of peace communication; a grounded sense of the structural-critique tradition that runs from Galtung and MacBride through to the present; and a baseline literacy on the AI transformation of public communication.

**Output of Weekend 1.** A 600-word concept paper submitted in Canvas, in which each candidate situates one professional context within the MacBride / communicative-sovereignty frame and identifies one current AI-related challenge in that context.

### Segment B — The AI Era's Specific Challenges

#### Weekend Gathering 2: Oslo, hosted by Fritt Ord, in cooperation with Faktisk.no (March)

#### *Module 4: Synthetic Media and the Information Environment*

The module addresses synthetic media — deepfakes, voice cloning, synthetic text — as a peace-communication problem (Chesney & Citron, 2019). Documented cases from the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gaza conflict, the 2023 Slovakian election, and emerging European examples are worked through. The *liar's dividend* — the way that the existence of synthetic media makes it possible to dismiss authentic evidence as fake — is given particular attention because it cuts in directions opposite to the more obvious deception risks. The module introduces detection techniques (provenance tracking, watermarking, content credentials) and is honest about their current limitations. Saturday afternoon includes a hands-on session at Fritt Ord with practitioners from Faktisk.no, working through real cases of recent Norwegian and Nordic concern.

#### *Module 5: Algorithmic Polarization and Platform Power*

The module addresses the structural pressures that platforms place on civic discourse. Bruns (2019) is taken as a corrective to oversimplified *filter bubble* narratives without dismissing the underlying concern.

Zuboff's (2019) account of surveillance capitalism is presented as the most influential structural critique. Suzor (2019) provides the legal-governance lens. The module treats the recent shift from search-mediated to AI-mediated information discovery as a fundamental change in how publics learn about the world, and considers the specific Norwegian and Nordic implications: Facebook's role in local political discourse, X under Musk, TikTok and Norwegian youth, and the question of what publics owe to themselves in an environment where attention is captured before it can be deliberately directed.

**Outcome of Weekend 2.** Candidates leave with practical literacy on synthetic media, an analytical understanding of algorithmic polarization, and a working sense of the current European regulatory landscape.

**Output of Weekend 2.** A 1,000-word analysis submitted in Canvas of an AI-mediated communication episode relevant to the candidate's professional context, with explicit attention to what tools or frames from the segment proved useful and which did not.

### Segment C — Practice and Norms

#### Weekend Gathering 3: UiA Kristiansand campus (April)

##### *Module 6: Norwegian and European Responses*

The module addresses regulatory and institutional responses. The EU AI Act (2024) and the Digital Services Act are read as the European model — a third position between US tech-libertarianism and Chinese state-control — and Norwegian implementation through Medietilsynet and Datatilsynet is examined in practical detail. Public-service broadcasting under AI conditions is treated through the NRK case: how does a publicly funded broadcaster maintain credibility, reach, and editorial standards when the audience is increasingly addressed by AI systems trained elsewhere? The fact-checking ecosystem (Faktisk.no and its peer organizations across the Nordics) is discussed both for what it can do and for what it cannot do alone.

##### *Module 7: Communicating Peace in the AI Era*

The course closes with practical communication strategy. The module distinguishes between *AI-augmented* communication (using AI tools to support human communication work) and *AI-mediated* communication (where the audience is reached through AI systems they do not control). Ethical frameworks for educator and practitioner communication are developed: when to use AI tools, when to disclose their use, how to teach others to recognize AI-generated content, and how to maintain credibility when colleagues and competitors are using AI to scale their output. Saturday afternoon is given to candidates drafting and refining communication strategies for their own contexts, with structured peer feedback.

**Outcome of Weekend 3.** Candidates leave with a concrete communication strategy developed and refined; a defended ethical position on AI-era practice; and a working network of peers facing similar challenges.

**Output of Weekend 3.** Final 3,000-word reflective essay (course assessment), submitted three weeks after the gathering, applying course frameworks to the candidate's professional communication work and articulating a position on the ethical use of AI tools in that work.

### Course 4 — Reading List

Bruns, A. (2019). *Are filter bubbles real?* Polity.

Chesney, R., & Citron, D. K. (2019). Deep fakes: A looming challenge for privacy, democracy, and national security. *California Law Review, 107*(6), 1753–1820.

Crawford, K. (2021). *Atlas of AI: Power, politics, and the planetary costs of artificial intelligence*. Yale University Press.

Galtung, J. (1998). High road, low road: Charting the course for peace journalism. *Track Two, 7*(4), 7–10.

Gerbner, G., Mowlana, H., & Nordenstreng, K. (Eds.). (1993). *The global media debate: Its rise, fall, and renewal*. Ablex.

Lynch, J., & McGoldrick, A. (2005). *Peace journalism*. Hawthorn Press.

Mansell, R. (2012). *Imagining the internet: Communication, innovation, and governance*. Oxford University Press.

Pickard, V. (2020). *Democracy without journalism? Confronting the misinformation society*. Oxford University Press.

Suzor, N. P. (2019). *Lawless: The secret rules that govern our digital lives*. Cambridge University Press.

Zuboff, S. (2019). *The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power*. PublicAffairs.

## Component 5 — Project Thesis: Independent Study under Supervision (10 ECTS)

### Overview

The project thesis integrates the analytical and practical foundations of Courses 1–4 into a substantial piece of independent work. Its purpose is twofold: to develop deeper engagement with one substantive question or problem in peace education, peace communication, geopolitics, or the broader conceptual terrain the courses have mapped; and to produce a piece of work that is genuinely useful in the candidate's professional setting. The thesis is the integrating capstone of the 30 ECTS programme, and is the threshold component for those seeking documentation of a complete videreutdanning.

The component is offered in two tracks, allowing candidates to choose the form of work most appropriate to their professional situation and intellectual interests. Both tracks are equally valued and equally demanding.

### Two Tracks

#### Project Track

The candidate designs, implements, and documents a peace-education or peace-communication intervention in their own professional setting. The intervention should be modest in scope but substantive in design: a curriculum module, a workshop series, a dialogue programme, a media-literacy initiative, an organizational communication strategy, a reconciliation activity. The intervention is grounded in the relevant scholarly literature and undergoes proportionate evaluation suitable to its scale (Patton, 2011).

Output for the Project Track:

- A project plan of 1,500–2,000 words including theory of change, stakeholder analysis, and evaluation strategy, submitted by week 3 for supervisor approval.
- Documentation of the implemented intervention. Formats include but are not limited to: curriculum materials, workshop reports, video documentation, audience analytics, written participant reflections (with consent), or facilitator logs.
- A 4,000–5,000 word critical reflection situating the project in the relevant scholarly literature, assessing what worked and what did not, what the candidate would do differently, and what the project contributes — even modestly — to wider practice.
- Oral defense (see below).

#### Research Track

The candidate produces a traditional research thesis of 10,000–12,000 words on a question of original investigation. Empirical work is encouraged at a scale appropriate to a 10 ECTS thesis: small-scale qualitative studies, document or media analysis, comparative case work, or careful theoretical synthesis with original argument. The thesis must engage primary literature beyond the courses' core readings and follow APA7 conventions throughout.

Output for the Research Track:

- A research proposal of 1,500–2,000 words including research question, literature review, methodology, and feasibility assessment, submitted by week 3 for supervisor approval.
- A completed thesis of 10,000–12,000 words submitted by the deadline.
- Oral defense (see below).

### Eligibility and Prerequisites

- Completion of at least two of Courses 1–4 with passing grades. The full pathway requires all four courses; partial pathways are accepted at the discretion of the supervisory committee.
- Approved project or research proposal (500–700 words) submitted to the supervisory committee at the kickoff seminar.
- For the Project Track: an appropriate professional setting in which the proposed work can be implemented, with documented permission from the relevant authority (school leadership, NGO management, public-sector supervisor).
- For the Research Track: methodological feasibility within the time and resources available; for studies involving human participants, NSD/Sikt approval where required.

### Supervision Structure

Each candidate is matched with a primary supervisor from IGUS faculty or affiliated researchers. Co-supervision is encouraged where the topic crosses departmental or institutional lines. A project on peace education in school settings might draw co-supervision from Institutt for pedagogikk; a project on AI literacy might draw on the EMAIL project network or the REACT consortium; a geopolitics project might draw from researchers at NUPI or PRIO.

The supervision pattern across the semester is:

- Kickoff seminar (group, half-day): introduction to the thesis component, presentation of preliminary topics, formation of supervisory matches, expectations and timeline.
- Individual supervision: minimum five meetings of 60–90 minutes across the semester, conducted in person, by video, or in hybrid form as practical.
- Mid-term progress seminar (group, full day): each candidate presents draft work and receives structured peer and faculty feedback.
- Final defense seminar: oral defense of the completed work.

### Assessment Criteria

Assessment evaluates substantive engagement with relevant scholarly literature; methodological rigor adapted to the chosen track; quality of analysis and argument; practical relevance and applicability for Project Track work, or contribution to the field for Research Track work; clarity of writing and adherence to APA7 referencing; and the quality of the oral defense. Standard Norwegian higher-education grading (A–F) applies, with A reserved for work demonstrating exceptional originality, rigor, and craft. A grade of C or better is required for the thesis to count toward a complete videreutdanning.

### Suggested Topic Areas

The list below is illustrative, not exhaustive. Candidates are strongly encouraged to bring their own professional contexts and questions, and the supervisory committee will work with candidates to refine ideas at the proposal stage.

### Topics in peace education proper

- Designing a peace-education curriculum module for ungdomsskole or videregående, building on Reardon (1988) and Bajaj and Hantzopoulos (2016).
- Comparative analysis of dialogue methodologies — Nansen dialogue (Bryn, 2018), restorative practice (Zehr, 2015), deep canvassing (Kalla & Broockman, 2020) — in a specific Norwegian institutional setting.
- Trauma-informed practice (SAMHSA, 2014; van der Kolk, 2014) in mottakssentre, schools serving refugee students, or municipal services.
- Reconciliation pedagogy in the wake of fornorsking — practical implications of the Sannhets- og forsoningskommisjonen (2023) for Norwegian classrooms or public institutions.
- Evaluation of an existing peace-education programme at Nansen Fredssenter, Arkivet, or another Norwegian peace institution.

### Topics in geopolitical literacy

- Teaching the Israel–Palestine conflict in Norwegian classrooms — frameworks, source material, and the question of false balance (Hess & McAvoy, 2015).
- Geopolitical literacy in NGO programming under shifting donor and operational conditions, drawing on Acharya (2018) and Krastev (2017).
- Norwegian foreign-policy communication — comparative analysis across two governments, situated in the long traditions described by Tamnes and Offerdal (2014).
- Climate-displacement framing in Norwegian media, building on Bordoff and O'Sullivan (2022).
- The Arctic in Norwegian public discourse — discourse analysis or comparative reading.

### Topics in peace communication and AI

- Synthetic-media literacy curricula for Norwegian school settings, building on Chesney and Citron (2019) and contemporary fact-checking practice.
- The MacBride tradition (MacBride, 1980) applied to AI-era platform governance — what does Many Voices, One World mean now?
- Communicative sovereignty in a specific community context — Sámi-language media, regional press, faith-community communication, minority-language broadcasting.
- Peace journalism (Galtung, 1998; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005) in the era of AI-mediated news production.
- AI literacy as peace work — institutional case study from school, NGO, or public-sector setting.

### Cross-cutting topics

- The role of cultural institutions (museums, libraries, choirs, theatres, cultural centres) in peace work.
- Peace education and climate education — convergences and tensions in the curriculum.
- Faith communities and peace work in contemporary Norway.
- Local-government peace work (kommunalt fredsarbeid) — case studies from one or several kommuner.

### Timeline

The standard thesis runs over one semester (typically autumn following completion of Year 2 spring, or any subsequent semester within three years of completing the prerequisite courses). The standard pattern is approximately:

- Week 1: Kickoff seminar, supervisor matching.
- Week 3: Project or research proposal due.
- Weeks 4–7: Initial supervision, literature review, project planning or research design.
- Week 8: Mid-term progress seminar.
- Weeks 9–13: Implementation (Project Track) or analysis and writing (Research Track).
- Week 14: Submission deadline.
- Weeks 15–16: Final defense seminars.

Candidates with significant professional commitments may apply for an extended timeline of two semesters, with corresponding adjustment in supervision intensity.

### Defense and Final Output

The oral defense is conducted in Norwegian or English at the candidate's choice. Each defense is approximately 60 minutes: a 15-minute candidate presentation, 30 minutes of examination by the committee (primary supervisor plus at least one external examiner), and 15 minutes of broader discussion including audience questions. The defense is open to other candidates in the cohort and to invited guests from the candidate's professional context. The final written submission is archived in the UiA Open Research Archive (UiA Open) where the candidate consents, with appropriate redaction for sensitive material.

### Pathway to Further Study

Candidates who complete the full 30 ECTS sequence and achieve a B grade or better on the thesis are eligible to apply for the proposed videreutdanning i fredspedagogikk og global samtidsanalyse (60 ECTS, currently in development) or for relevant master's-level study at UiA or partner institutions, with potential for credit transfer determined on a case-by-case basis.

## Suggested Norwegian Target Groups

### School sector

Teachers in ungdomsskole and videregående (especially samfunnsfag, KRLE, norsk, historie, mediefag); skolebibliotekarer; rådgivere; miljøarbeidere i skolen. Course 4 is particularly relevant for teachers working with mediefag and digital kompetanse.

### Peace and human-rights institutions

Programme staff at Nansen Fredssenter (Lillehammer), Arkivet freds- og menneskerettighetssenter (Kristiansand), HL-senteret, Falstadsenteret, and similar regional sites.

### Humanitarian and development NGOs

Redd Barna, Norsk Folkehjelp, Røde Kors Norge, Kirkens Nødhjelp, Flyktninghjelpen, Strømmestiftelsen, Plan Norge, KFUK-KFUM, Changemaker — particularly staff working on youth education, civic engagement, and global citizenship programmes. Courses 3 and 4 are also directly relevant to international-programme staff, communications officers, and policy advisors at these organizations.

### Public sector

IMDi, UDI, Bufdir, and Utdanningsdirektoratet caseworkers and programme officers; municipal staff in integrering, oppvekst, and ungdomstjenester (especially in Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger, Drammen, Kristiansand); SLT-koordinatorer; ansatte i folkebibliotek. Course 3 additionally addresses staff at Utenriksdepartementet, Forsvarsdepartementet, and Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap (DSB) whose work has been reshaped by the new geopolitical environment. Course 4 addresses public-sector communicators, kommunikasjonsrådgivere, and staff at Medietilsynet and Datatilsynet.

### Civil society and faith communities

Trossamfunn med ungdomsarbeid (Den norske kirke, muslimske, humanetiske og andre); studieforbund (særlig Studieforbundet AOF og Folkeuniversitetet); lokale frivilligsentraler.

### Media and communication

Journalists and communications professionals — particularly relevant for Courses 3 and 4. Lokaljournalister, ansatte i NRK regionale kontorer, kommunikasjonsarbeidere i NGO-sektoren, redaktører i fagpresse og lokalpresse, frilansere som dekker internasjonale forhold. The communicative-sovereignty thread running through the programme makes it of particular relevance for journalists working under pressure from AI-era reorganization of newsroom and platform economics.

### Mode of Delivery

The programme is designed for the EVU portfolio of Institutt for global utvikling og samfunnsplanlegging at UiA, and fits naturally beside the department's existing development-management and global-studies offerings. The 30 ECTS total positions the full sequence as a complete videreutdanning, suitable for documentation toward kompetanseheving in the school sector and for NGO and public-sector professional development.

### Format

Hybrid samlingsbasert. Each 5 ECTS course runs over one semester with three physical gatherings (Friday–Saturday), bridged by structured asynchronous activity in Canvas — short video lectures, curated reading sets, peer-discussion forums, and pre-gathering preparation tasks. The 10 ECTS thesis component is supervised independent study with structured group seminars at start, mid-term, and defense.

### Location and Scheduling

Courses 1 and 3 run in autumn semester; Courses 2 and 4 run in spring semester. The thesis component runs in any subsequent semester, typically autumn of Year 3. Annual repetition is the standard pattern, allowing candidates to enter at any course and proceed at their own pace within a three-year window.

Each course holds two gatherings on the UiA Kristiansand campus and one at a partner institution: the Nobel Peace Center and Nansen Fredssenter for Course 1; Nansen Fredssenter for Course 2; the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) for Course 3; and Fritt Ord, in cooperation with Faktisk.no, for Course 4. Course 2's facilitation labs and the thesis defense seminars require physical attendance. Candidates may take any course independently or all four plus thesis as the full pathway.

### Pricing and Access

Standard EVU pricing, with reserved-seat schemes for NGO staff funded through partnerships with Nansen Fredssenter, Arkivet, NUPI, Fritt Ord, or directly with major NGOs. Stipend opportunities through Kompetanse Norge and sector-specific funds — including Utdanningsdirektoratet's kompetanse for kvalitet — are flagged in recruitment. The thesis component carries an additional supervision fee structured according to UiA EVU conventions.

### Teaching Staff

Anchored in IGUS faculty, with guest contributions from REACT consortium partners, Nansen Fredssenter, Arkivet, the Nobel Peace Center, NUPI, PRIO, and Fritt Ord. Course 2 additionally draws on practitioner-facilitators with documented dialogue-method experience; Course 3 draws on senior researchers and former diplomats with current-affairs expertise; Course 4 draws on journalism, fact-checking, and AI-policy practitioners. Thesis supervision draws on the full faculty network including the EMAIL project team for AI-related topics.

### Pathway Potential

Together the four courses form a coherent 20 ECTS taught pathway, and with the thesis a complete 30 ECTS videreutdanning i fredspedagogikk og global samtidsanalyse. The structure could later be extended

into a 60 ECTS programme adding research methods, comparative case work, and a substantial fieldwork or research term, positioning UiA as the Nordic centre for peace-education professional development.

### A Note on Reading Load

Each of the four taught courses assigns ten core readings (the lists above) plus approximately 200 additional pages of curated supplementary material distributed across the three segments — chapter excerpts, journal articles, Norwegian-language sources from PRIO, NUPI, NKVTS, Medietilsynet, and the Nordic Council of Ministers, and selected primary documents (UNESCO frameworks, the Sannhets- og forsoningskommisjonen report, parts of the Nansen dialogue archive, EU AI Act summaries, current NUPI and PRIO policy briefs, and Faktisk.no case material). The reading load is calibrated to part-time professional learners: roughly forty pages per week across the semester, manageable alongside full-time work.

The thesis component requires a substantially expanded literature engagement. Candidates are expected to identify and engage twenty to thirty additional primary sources beyond the courses' core readings, with the supervisor's guidance, sufficient to support a substantive scholarly contribution at thesis scale.

## Consolidated References

The following list consolidates references cited in the rationale and across the four taught courses. Course-specific reading lists appear within each course section above; this consolidated list provides the full scholarly apparatus for the programme as a whole and serves as a starting bibliography for thesis candidates. All references follow APA7 conventions.

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